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Abstract
A large body of literature in international economics has tried to explain the effect of
asymmetric changes in trade barriers in welfare of the liberalizing country, however,
there is no consensus on this issue. In this paper, I focus on the implications of a decline
in import costs in welfare of the liberalizing country. I utilize a version of computational
general equilibrium model of international trade (based on Armington assumption)
where countries are potentially asymmetric in terms of labor endowment, productivity,
trade barriers etc. under two different specifications of trade costs: (i) standard iceberg
cost formulation and (ii) tariffs. The model numerically proves that unilateral trade
liberalization is welfare improving for the liberalizing country in Armington setup with
iceberg costs. However, when using tariffs, I numerically show that there exists a
positive optimal tariff rate which maximizes welfare. This result indicates that a reduc-
tion in tariffs may either benefit or immiserize the liberalizing country depending on the
pre-liberalization value of tariff. In the literature, a simple formula has been driven
which shows the gains from trade for the case of iceberg costs. I generalize this formula
in Armington setup with tariffs and highlight the importance of revenue generating
tariffs.
Keywords: unilateral trade liberalization, iceberg costs, tariffs, computational general
equilibrium, welfare
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1. Introduction
In this paper, I focus on the implications of a decline in import costs (in terms of both iceberg
costs and tariffs) in welfare1 of the liberalizing country. There is a vast literature on the effect of
asymmetric changes in trade costs in welfare of the liberalizing country; however, there is no
consensus on this issue. Moreover, Eaton and Kortum (2002) [1] derive a simple formula which
shows the gains from trade and this formula is generalized by Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodriguez-Clare (2012) [2] in the case of iceberg costs. I also generalize this formula in
Armington setup with tariffs and highlight the importance of revenue generating tariffs.
In Melitz [3] setup with two large but possibly asymmetric economies, unilateral trade liberal-
ization in terms of iceberg costs is welfare improving for the liberalizing country. Similarly, in a
version of the Melitz [3] model for the case of a small economy, Demidova and Rodriguez-
Clare [4] also establish that welfare increases for a country that unilaterally reduces importing
trade barriers in terms of iceberg costs.
These results stand in sharp contrast to two different types of models. In the first category,
Felbermayr and Jung [5] show that in a two-country Melitz [3] setup, unilateral liberalization
of import tariffs lowers welfare of the liberalizing country. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare [6]
also show the existence of an optimal tariff in the small economy version of the Melitz [3]
model suggesting that reduction in tariffs (compared to optimal level) lowers the welfare in the
liberalizing country. As mentioned in [5], the reason behind this argument is that tariffs
redistribute income across countries and this generates additional leverage to the selection
effect in the models with firm-level heterogeneity.
In the second category, including [7–9], trade liberalization in home country results in a
welfare loss. In this category, the difference arises from the presence of an outside sector that
pins down the wages. However, these setups with outside sector ignore the general equilib-
rium forces that are crucial for the welfare analysis. Therefore, Demidova [7], Melitz and
Ottaviano [8], Ossa [9] predict immiserization for the liberalizing country due to unilateral
trade liberalization. Felbermayr and Jung [5] also point out that the assumption of a linear
outside sector distorts the welfare predictions of the model: In a Melitz and Ottaviano [8] setup
(due to a reduction in import costs), firms in liberalizing country relocate into the relatively
more protected market (outside sector) from where they serve the liberalized economy. How-
ever, in Melitz [3] (without an outside sector) setup with Pareto assumption,2 the wage adjust-
ment is exactly such that the relocation channel is compensated.
This paper utilizes a version of computational general equilibriummodel of international trade
(based on Armington assumption) where countries are possibly asymmetric in terms of labor
endowment, productivity, trade costs, etc., under two different specifications: iceberg costs and
tariffs. This paper aims to compute the effects of unilateral trade liberalization in welfare of the
1
Given the class of models considered in this study, I use the terms welfare and real income interchangeably throughout the
paper.
2
This distributional assumption is widely used in the literature. Besides the analytical convenience of this distribution,
Eaton et al. [10], among others, document that this distribution provides a reasonable approximation for the observed
distribution of firm sizes.
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liberalizing country in both specifications. To achieve this goal, I follow two main steps for
each version. I first define and characterize the general equilibrium. In other words, I obtain a
system of nonlinear equations which should be solved numerically. Second, after determining
the parameters, I compute the equilibrium with numerical methods (using MATLAB). The
model numerically proves that unilateral trade liberalization is welfare improving for the
liberalizing country in Armington setup with iceberg costs. However, with tariffs, I numeri-
cally show that there exists a positive optimal tariff rate which maximizes welfare suggesting
that a reduction in tariffs may either increase or decrease welfare of the liberalizing country
depending on the pre-liberalization value of tariff.
This paper also discusses the extensions of a simple formula which is first derived by Eaton and
Kortum [1] and then generalized by Arkolakis et al. [2]. These papers focus on welfare gains
from trade relative to autarky in the case of iceberg costs. I generalize this formula in Armington
setup with tariffs and highlight the important difference between these two formulas.
The next section presents two specifications of the model and characterizes the equilibrium for
each case. Section 3 discusses the results of the numerical computations. Section 4 analytically
analyzes the welfare gains from trade. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
I utilize a version of Armington model [11–13] with two different specifications. In the first
specification, I assume that trade costs are in terms of standard iceberg formulation. However,
in the second case, I assume that trade costs are in terms of tariffs and tariff revenue is
redistributed to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion. In both versions, there are N countries
indexed by i, j ¼ 1,…,N where i and j denote exporters and importers, respectively. Each
country has a population of measure L and I assume that all consumers are identical within
countries. Armington setup is based on the assumption that each country produces a different
good. Consumers in each country value not just domestically produced goods but also goods
produced by foreign countries.
2.1. Model with iceberg costs
2.1.1. Demand
Country j maximizes the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function,
Uj, over N goods each produced by a different country:
max
xij
Uj ¼ ∑
N
i¼1
α
1
σ
ijx
σ−1
σ
ij
 ! σ
σ−1
(1)
where xij is the consumption in country j of a good produced in country i. Therefore, xjj denotes
the consumption of domestic good. αij > 0 is the demand parameter that reflects the prefer-
ences of country j toward goods produced in i. The elasticity of substitution across good
varieties is given by σ > 1. A higher value of σ implies goods that are more substitutable. Each
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consumer in country j has one unit of labor endowment which is in elastically supplied in a
competitive labor market. Country j faces the following budget constraint:
∑
N
i¼1
pijxij ¼ wjLj (2)
where pij is the price of a good produced in country i which is consumed by country j.
Therefore, pjj denotes the price of domestic good. wj denotes the nominal wage in country j,
and wjLj is the total (nominal) income of country j.
The utility maximization subject to the budget constraint yields the following demand func-
tion of country j toward goods produced in i:
xij ¼ αij
pij
Pj
 −σ wjLj
Pj
(3)
where Pj ¼ ð∑
N
i¼1αijp
1−σ
ij Þ
1
1−σ is the price index in country j. Note that the elasticity of substitution
across good is defined as
∂ln
xii
xij
 
∂ln
pii
pij
  : Using Eq. (3), I get the ratio of xiixij and by taking the logarithm
of both sides, I obtain:
ln
xii
xij
 
¼ −σln
pii
pij
 !
þ ðσ−1Þln
Pi
Pj
 
þ ln
αiiwiLi
αijwjLj
 
(4)
Using Eq. (4), I simply get
∂ ln
xii
xij
 
∂ ln
pii
pij
  ¼ −σ: This result implies that the elasticity of substitution
between good xii and xij is equal to σ.
2.1.2. Supply
Goods are produced in competitive markets. Labor is the only factor of production. In country
i, there is a representative producer which has the constant returns to scale production tech-
nology: yij ¼ φilij, where yij is the output produced in country i which is sold to country j,φi is
the productivity level in country and lij is the labor amount used to produce good in country i
in order to sell to country j. Hence, each country has potentially different productivity levels. τij
is the standard iceberg formulation of trade costs. τij > 1 implies that if one unit of good is
shipped from country i to country j, only a fraction, 1τij, of the good arrives. There are no trade
costs for domestic goods: τii ¼ 1. Both production and trade costs are in terms of labor.
The profit maximization of a representative producer in country i when selling to country j is
given by:
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max
xij
pijxij−
wixijτij
φi
(5)
The profit maximization in competitive markets yields the following price rule:
pij ¼
wiτij
φi
(6)
2.1.3. Equilibrium conditions
In order to fully characterize the equilibrium, one needs two more conditions. I first consider
the labor market clearing condition. This condition implies that labor supply has to be equal to
the total labor demand in country i. Hence, labor market clearing condition for country i can be
written as:
Li ¼ ∑
N
j¼1
xijτij
φi
(7)
Second equilibrium condition is the balanced trade condition. This condition implies that the
value of total imports has to be equal to the value of total exports of country i. Balanced trade
condition for country i can be written as:
∑
N
j¼1ði≠jÞ
pijxij ¼ ∑
N
j¼1ði≠jÞ
pjixji (8)
2.1.4. Characterization of equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by N2 demand equations, N labor market clearing conditions
and N
2−N
2 balanced trade equations. Hence, in total, one needs
3N2þN
2 equations to characterize
the equilibrium. In particular, for a two-country model ðN ¼ 2Þ, the seven equilibrium equa-
tions are given by:
x11 ¼ α11
p11
P1
 −σ
w1L1
P1
(9)
x12 ¼ α12
p12
P2
 −σ w2L2
P2
(10)
x22 ¼ α22
p22
P2
 −σ w2L2
P2
(11)
x21 ¼ α21
p21
P1
 −σ w1L1
P1
(12)
L1 ¼
x11τ11
φ1
þ
x12τ12
φ1
(13)
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L2 ¼
x21τ21
φ2
þ
x22τ22
φ2
(14)
p21x21 ¼ p12x12 (15)
However, the given system has twelve unknown variables: eight prices (p11, p12, p21, p22,
w1,w2,P1,P2) and four consumption quantities (x11, x12, x21, x22), but only seven equations. By
using the definition of price index Pj ¼ ð∑
N
i¼1αijp
1−σ
ij Þ
1
1−σ, the solution of profit maximization
problem pij ¼
wiτij
φi
and normalizing one of the prices, ðp22Þ, to one, the equilibrium is character-
ized by a system of seven unknowns and seven equations:
x11 ¼ α11p11
−σ w1L1
α11p
1−σ
11 þ α21τ
1−σ
21
(16)
x12 ¼ α12ðp11τ12Þ
−σ w2L2
α22 þ α12ðp11τ12Þ
1−σ
(17)
x22 ¼ α22
w2L2
α22 þ α12ðp11τ12Þ
1−σ
(18)
x21 ¼ α21τ21
−σ w1L1
α11p
1−σ
11 þ α21τ
1−σ
21
(19)
L1 ¼
x11
φ1
þ
x12τ12
φ1
(20)
L2 ¼
x21τ21
φ2
þ
x22
φ2
(21)
τ21x21 ¼ p11τ12x12 (22)
Given the value of parameters and price normalization, one has to solve for three prices
(p11,w1,w2) and four consumption quantities (x11, x12, x21, x22). I use MATLAB in order to solve
this nonlinear equation system.
2.2. Model with tariffs
2.2.1. Demand
Now, I assume that trade barriers are in terms of tariffs rather than iceberg trade costs. In this
setup, tariff revenue from imports is redistributed to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion.
The only change in country j’s utility maximization problem is the budget constraint:
∑
N
i¼1
pijxij ¼ wjLj þ Tj (23)
where Tj represents the tariff revenue of country j.
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The utility maximization subject to this new budget constraint yields the following demand
equation:
xij ¼ αij
pij
Pj
 −σ wjLj þ Tj
Pj
(24)
where Pj ¼ ð∑
N
i¼1αijp
1−σ
ij Þ
1
1−σ is the price index in country j.
2.2.2. Supply
The only change in firm’s problem is that τij is treated as tariffs rather than iceberg costs. Tariffs
are rebated lump sum to the consumers. The solution for profit maximization of a representa-
tive producer in country i when selling to country j in competitive markets is unchanged:
pij ¼
wiτij
φi
(25)
2.2.3. Equilibrium conditions
In order to fully characterize the equilibrium, one needs three conditions: labor market clearing
condition, the balanced trade condition and the tariff revenue that has to be fully redistributed
to the consumers.
Labor market clearing implies that labor supply in country has to be equal to the total labor
demand in country i:
Li ¼ ∑
N
j¼1
xij
φi
(26)
Note that in contrast to the iceberg formulation, there are no additional production and
employment for tariffs. Second equilibrium condition is the balanced trade condition. This
condition implies that the value of total imports has to be equal to the value of total exports of
country i. Balanced trade condition for country i can be written as
∑
N
j¼1ði≠jÞ
pijxij
τij
¼ ∑
N
j¼1ði≠jÞ
pjixji
τji
(27)
where dividing by τij takes care of pijxij being defined as inclusive of tariffs. Note that pijxij is
the value of imports of country j from i inclusive of tariffs. However,
pijxij
τij
is the value of imports
exclusive of tariffs.
Finally, tariff revenue in country j is given by:
Tj ¼ piixijðτij−1Þ (28)
Unilateral Trade Liberalization and Welfare Analysis: Iceberg Trade Costs versus Tariffs
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2.2.4. Characterization of equilibrium
Consider a two-country ðN ¼ 2Þ case. Normalizing one of the prices, p22, to one, the equilib-
rium is characterized by a system of nine unknowns and nine equations:
x11 ¼ α11p
−σ
11
w1L1 þ T1
α11p
1−σ
11 þ α21τ
1−σ
21
(29)
x12 ¼ α12ðp11τ12Þ
−σ w2L2 þ T2
α22 þ α12ðp11τ12Þ
1−σ
(30)
x22 ¼ α22
w2L2 þ T2
α22 þ α12ðp11τ12Þ
1−σ
(31)
x21 ¼ α21τ
−σ
21
w1L1 þ T1
α11p
1−σ
11 þ α21τ
1−σ
21
(32)
L1 ¼
x11
φ1
þ
x12
φ1
(33)
L2 ¼
x21
φ2
þ
x22
φ2
(34)
p22x21 ¼ p11x12 (35)
T1 ¼ p22x21ðτ21−1Þ (36)
T2 ¼ p11x12ðτ12−1Þ (37)
Given the value of parameters and price normalization, one has to solve for three prices
(p11,w1,w2), four consumption quantities (x11, x12, x21, x22) and tariff revenue for both countries,
T1 and T2.
3. Numerical exercises: unilateral trade liberalization
3.1. Iceberg costs
Consider two symmetric countries: home (country 1) and foreign (country 2). Main goal
of this section is to compute the effects of unilateral trade liberalization (at home) in
welfare. In a benchmark model, I assume that τ12 ¼ τ21 ¼ 1:2. In the counterfactual
analysis, I set import barriers in terms of iceberg costs for home country (τ21) to 1
keeping τ12 unchanged. Table 1 presents the parameter values which are used in numer-
ical computations.
For the trade elasticity, I follow Anderson and Van Wincoop [14]. Anderson and Van Wincoop
[14] suggest that the value for trade elasticity (ε) lies in the range of ½−10, −5 after a
International Trade - On the Brink of Change10
comprehensive review of the existing literature. In our Armington setup, trade elasticity, ε, is
equal to one minus elasticity of substitution across goods, 1−σ.3 In the numeric computations, I
choose a value of 8 for σ in order to match ε = −7.
Table 2 presents the computation results of both exercises: benchmark model and counterfac-
tual analysis.
Computation results in Table 2 imply that unilateral reduction in iceberg costs in country 1
increases the welfare in country 1. The mechanism is as follows: A decrease in import trade
barriers in country 1 reduces the price of the imported good in country 1 which yields an
increase in imports from country 2. To restore trade balance nominal wages in country should
fall and this causes a decline in the price of domestic goods. The reduction in both prices
(domestic and import) yields a reduction in aggregate price index in country 1 as well. The
decrease in price index dominates the decrease in nominal wages and therefore, real income
(welfare) in country 1 is increasing. Moreover, the unilateral reduction in iceberg costs in
country 1 causes an increase in real income of country 2. However, the increase in country 2 is
smaller than the increase in country 1.
Figure 1 depicts the welfare changes associated with unilateral trade liberalization (in terms of
iceberg costs) in country 1 keeping τ12 ¼ 1:2 unchanged.
In Figure 1, I conclude that trade liberalization (in the case of iceberg costs) monotonically
increases the welfare of the liberalizing country.
Benchmark model Counterfactual analysis
L1 1 1
L2 1 1
φ1 1 1
φ2 1 1
σ 8 8
α11 0.6 0.6
α12 0.4 0.4
α21 0.4 0.4
α22 0.6 0.6
τ11 1 1
τ12 1.2 1.2
τ21 1.2 1
τ22 1 1
Table 1. Parameter values.
3
This result is proven in Section 4.
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3.2. Tariffs
Using the same parameters in Table 1 for the benchmark and counterfactual analyses, Table 3
presents the computation results of both exercises in the case of tariffs. Exports and imports
values are presented in both ways (inclusive and exclusive in tariffs).
Benchmark model (I) Counterfactual analysis (II) (II)/(I)
p11 1 0.9202 0.9202
p12 1.2 1.1043 0.9202
p21 1.2 1 0.8333
p22 1 1 1
w1 1 0.9202 0.9202
w2 1 1 1
P1 1.0498 0.9461 0.9012
P2 1.0498 1.0324 0.9834
Welfare1 0.9526 0.9726 1.0210
Welfare2 0.9526 0.9686 1.0167
Exports/GDP1 15.69% 27.14% 1.7297
Imports/GDP1 15.69% 27.14% 1.7297
Exports/GDP2 15.69% 24.98% 1.5920
Imports/GDP2 15.69% 24.98% 1.5920
Table 2. Computation results.
Figure 1. Welfare changes associated with unilateral trade liberalization (in terms of iceberg costs) in country 1.
International Trade - On the Brink of Change12
In contrast to the iceberg cost formulation, unilateral trade liberalization causes a welfare loss
in the liberalizing country 1. However, this result depends on pre-liberalization value of tariffs.
Figure 2 shows the welfare changes associated with unilateral trade liberalization in country 1
(in terms of tariffs) keeping τ12 ¼ 1:2 unchanged.
Figure 2 also implies that there exists an optimal positive tariff rate (which maximizes welfare)
which is around 20% in our case.
3.3. Discussion: iceberg costs versus tariffs
Numerical solutions suggest that in Armington setup, iceberg cost and tariff formulations give
the different welfare implications. Therefore, the type of trade barrier plays a crucial role in
Benchmark model (I) Counterfactual analysis (II) (II)/(I)
p11 1 0.9092 0.9092
p12 1.2 1.0910 0.9091
p21 1.2 1 0.8333
p22 1 1 1
w1 1 0.9092 0.9092
w2 1 1 1
P1 1.0498 0.9377 0.8932
P2 1.0498 1.0292 0.9803
Welfare1 0.9781 0.9696 0.9913
Welfare2 0.9781 1.0167 1.0394
Exports/GDP1 13.07% 25.51% 1.9517
Imports/GDP1 13.07% 25.51% 1.9517
Exports/GDP2 13.07% 22.16% 1.6954
Imports/GDP2 13.07% 22.16% 1.6954
Exports/GDP1* 15.68% 25.51% 1.6269
Imports/GDP1* 15.68% 25.51% 1.6269
Exports/GDP2* 15.68% 22.16% 1.4132
Imports/GDP2* 15.68% 22.16% 1.4132
Tariff revenue1 0.0268 0 0
Tariff revenue2 0.0268 0.0464 1.7313
Tariff revenue1/GDP1 2.61% 0% 0
Tariff revenue2/GDP2 2.61% 4.43% 1.6973
Tariff multiplier1 1.0268 1 0.9738
Tariff multiplier2 1.0268 1.0464 1.0190
* Inclusive of tariffs.
Table 3. Computation results.
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computing the welfare gains due to trade liberalization. This result can be generalized (see [1,
3, 15, 16] for details).
Similar to my findings, Felbermayr and Jung [5] show that in a two-country Melitz [3] setup,
unilateral liberalization of import tariffs lowers welfare of the liberalizing country. Demidova
and Rodriguez-Clare [6] also show the existence of an optimal tariff in the small economy
version of the Melitz [3] model, suggesting that reduction in tariffs (compared to optimal level)
lowers the welfare in liberalizing country.
4. Gains from trade: welfare analysis
Eaton and Kortum [1] show that welfare gains from trade are function of only two elements in
the case of iceberg costs: (i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods, which is equal to one
minus the import penetration ratio and (ii) trade elasticity (an elasticity of imports with respect
to variable iceberg trade costs). This result is generalized by Arkolakis et al. [2] for a large class
of trade models, including the one used in this paper (version of Armington model), Eaton and
Kortum [1], Krugman [15] and Melitzs [3] models in the case of iceberg costs.4 This generalized
result implies that although recent quantitative trade models can explain a wider set of micro-
Figure 2. Welfare changes associated with unilateral trade liberalization (in terms of tariffs) in country 1.
4
The Frechet and the Parteo distributions are considered for productivities in Eaton and Kortum [1] and Melitz [3]
frameworks, respectively.
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level facts, all type of models mentioned above calculate the exact same amount of gains from
trade in the case of iceberg costs. In summary, welfare gains from trade liberalization do not
depend on the different models microstructure.5
However, this paper argues that the result generalized by Arkolakis et al. [2] is only true in the
case of iceberg costs, but not in the tariff formulation, since the formula generalized by
Arkolakis et al. [2] ignores the tariff redistribution.
Section 4.1 derives the simple formula which is generalized by Arkolakis et al. [2] in the case of
iceberg costs. Section 4.2 extends the simple formula in the case of tariffs and highlights the
important difference between two formulas.
4.1. Simple formula for the gains from trade: iceberg cost formulation
Arkolakis et al. [2] generalized a simple formula for the gains from trade for a large set of trade
models including Armington [11], Krugman [15], Eaton and Kortum [1] and Melitz [3] models
in the case of iceberg costs. In order to compute the gains from trade by this simple formula,
one only needs two elements: (i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods (λjj) and (ii)
elasticity of imports with respect to iceberg costs, ð1−σÞ.
Using our model in Section 3, let’s first show that trade elasticity (elasticity of imports with
respect to iceberg costs) which is defined as
∂lnðXij=XjjÞ
∂lnτij
is equal to ð1−σ). Second, one can write the
share of expenditure on domestic goods, λjj, just in terms of prices. Finally, one can relate these
two elements with welfare (real income) definition W j ¼
wj
Pj
in country j.
For the first step, let’s write the equation for imports of country j from country i:
xij ¼ αij
pij
Pj
 −σ wjLj
Pj
(38)
Let’s multiply both sides by pij in order to get the value of imports (rather than quantities) of
country j from country i which is denoted by Xij:
Xij ¼ αij
pij
Pj
 1−σ
wjLj (39)
Let’s derive Xij=Xjj by using the equality of pij ¼
wiτij
φi
(recall that τjj ¼ 1):
5
Arkolakis et al. [2] discuss some extensions of their result. Adding multiple sectors, tradable intermediate goods or
multiple factors of production into the model can change the validity of their result. In particular, Balistreri et al. [17]
add a second non-tradable sector and they show that models with perfect and monopolistic competition no longer have
the same welfare implications.
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Xij
Xjj
¼
αij
αjj
wi
wj
φj
φi
τij
 1−σ
(40)
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of Eq. (40), I obtain:
ln
Xij
Xjj
 
¼ ln
αij
αjj
 
þ ð1−σÞln
wi
wj
φj
φi
 
þ ð1−σÞlnðτijÞ (41)
By using Eq. (41), after the simple math, I get:
∂ln
Xij
Xjj
 
∂lnτij
¼ ð1−σÞ (42)
Hence, the trade elasticity (elasticity of imports with respect to iceberg costs) is equal to one
minus elasticity of substitution across good varieties.
For the second step, I use the definition λjj≡
Xjj
∑
N
i¼1
Xij
. Using Eq. (39) and∑
N
i¼1Xij ¼ wjLj equality, I
can rewrite this equation as follows:
λjj ¼
αjj
pjj
Pj
 1−σ
wjLj
wjLj
¼ αjj
pjj
Pj
 1−σ
(43)
After solving for
pjj
Pj
, I obtain:
pjj
Pj
¼
λjj
αjj
  1
1−σ
(44)
For the final step, let’s define welfare in country j,W j, which is measured by the real income
wj
Pj
.
Using the pjj ¼
wj
φj
result (recall that τjj ¼ 1), I can rewrite the real income as:
wj
Pj
¼
pjjφj
Pj
(45)
Finally, by substituting
pjj
Pj
¼
λjj
αjj
  1
1−σ
into the Eq. (45), I getW j as follows:
W j ¼
wj
Pj
¼ λjj
1
1−σαjj
1
σ−1φj (46)
Welfare gains from trade can be shown as the change in welfare before and after trade:
International Trade - On the Brink of Change16
W^ j
W j
¼
λ^jj
1
1−σαjj
1
σ−1φj
λjj
1
1−σαjj
1
σ−1φj
¼
λ^jj
λjj
 ! 1
1−σ
(47)
where W^ j and W j denote welfare after and before trade, respectively. Since I focus on trade
liberalization, I assume that there is no change in other parameters such as αjj and φj. I
conclude that to compute the change in welfare due to trade liberalization, one only needs to
know the change in share of expenditure on domestic goods and trade elasticity, ε ¼ 1−σ.
Let’s apply our formula to the numerical exercise in Section 3.1 for country 1. 0.1569 and 0.2714
are the share of imports to GDP before and after unilateral trade liberalization (reduction in τ21
from 1.2 to 1), respectively. Hence, I get 1 − 0.1569 = 0.8431 before trade liberalization and 1 −
0.2714 = 0.7286 after trade liberalization as the share of expenditures on domestic goods. In
Section 3, I assume that the elasticity of substitution across good is eight suggesting a value of
−7 (ε ¼ 1−8 ¼ −7Þ for the trade elasticity. Now, let’s substitute these values into our simple
formula:
W^ j
W j
¼
λ^jj
λjj
 ! 1
1−σ
¼
0:7286
0:8431
  1
1−8
¼ 1:0210 (48)
National income in country 1 increased by 2.1% due to unilateral trade liberalization which is
the same result I obtain in Table 2.
4.2. Simple formula for the gains from trade: tariff formulation
This section extends the simple formula derived by Arkolakis et al. [2]. In this section, I assume
that trade barriers are in the form of tariffs rather than iceberg costs. In order to compute the
gains from trade by the extended formula, one needs three elements rather than two: (i) the
share of expenditure on domestic goods (λjj), (ii) elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs
ð1−σ) and (iii) a tariff multiplier (βj).
Applying the similar steps with the previous section (the case of iceberg costs), I obtain the
same equation for
pjj
Pj
in the case of tariffs:
pjj
Pj
¼
λjj
αjj
  1
1−σ
(49)
However, in the case of tariff, total income in country j is Xj ¼ wjLj þ Tj rather than just wjLj:
Now, let’s drive the tariff multiplier, βj, for country j. By definition, I have:
Xj ≡Xj (50)
Multiplying RHS by
wjLj
wjLj
, I obtain:
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Xj ≡Xj
wjLj
wjLj
(51)
Since I know that wjLj ¼ Xj−Tj
Xj ≡Xj
wjLj
Xj−Tj
(52)
Hence, I have:
Xj ¼ βjwjLj (53)
where βj ¼
Xj
Xj−Tj
is the tariff multiplier. Since Xj−Tj < Xj with positive tariff revenues, multiplier
βj takes values >1. I can rewrite βj as 1−
Tj
Xj
 
−1
which is the inverse of one minus the share of
tariffs in total income. Hence, it is enough to know the share of tariffs in total income in order
to compute the tariff multiplier. Given the tariff multiplier, the real income is equal to βj
wj
Pj
.
Using the pjj ¼
wj
φj
result (recall that τjj ¼ 1), one can rewrite the real wage as:
βj
wj
Pj
¼ βj
pjjφj
Pj
(54)
Finally, by substituting
pjj
Pj
¼
λjj
αjj
  1
1−σ
into Eq. (54), I getW j as follows:
W j ¼ βj
wj
Pj
¼ βjλjj
1
1−σαjj
1
σ−1φj (55)
Welfare gains from trade can be shown as the change in welfare before and after trade:
W^ j
W j
¼
β^jλ^jj
1
1−σαjj
1
σ−1φj
βjλjj
1
1−σαjj
1
σ−1φj
¼
β^j
βj
λ^jj
λjj
 ! 1
1−σ
(56)
where W^ j and W j denote welfare after and before trade, respectively. Since I focus on trade
liberalization, I assume that there is no change in other parameters such as αjj and φj. I
conclude that to compute the change in welfare due to trade liberalization, one only needs to
know changes in share of expenditure on domestic goods, trade elasticity and the tariff
multiplier.
Let’s apply our formula to the numerical exercise in Section 3.2 for country 1. 0.1568 and 0.2551
are the share of imports to GDP (inclusive of tariffs) before and after unilateral trade liberali-
zation (reduction in τ21 from 1.2 to 1), respectively, in the case of tariffs. Hence, I get 1 − 0.1568
= 0.8432 before trade liberalization and 1 − 0.2551 = 0.7449 after trade liberalization as the share
of expenditures on domestic goods. In Section 3, I assume that the elasticity of substitution
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across good is 8 suggesting a value of −7 for the trade elasticity. Now, let’s substitute these
values into our simple formula and I obtain:
W^ j
W j
¼
λ^jj
λjj
 ! 1
1−σ β^j
βj
¼
0:7449
0:8432
  1
1−8 1
1:0268
¼ 0:9913 (57)
National income in country 1 decreased due to unilateral trade liberalization which is the same
result I obtain in Table 3.
5. Conclusion
Although there is a fairly sizable literature in international trade, there is no general agreement
on the implications of unilateral trade liberalization in welfare of the liberalizing country. This
paper studies the effects of a decline in import costs (in terms of both iceberg cost and tariffs) in
welfare of the liberalizing country. Based on Armington model, I numerically show that
unilateral trade liberalization is welfare improving for the liberalizing country in the case of
iceberg costs. However, in the tariff case, I numerically show that there exists a positive
optimal tariff rate which maximizes welfare, suggesting that a reduction in tariffs may either
increases or decreases welfare of liberalizing country depending on the pre-liberalization value
of tariff.
Moreover, this paper also discusses the welfare gains from trade with a simple equation which
is derived by Eaton and Kortum [1] and generalized by Arkolakis et al. [2] in the case of iceberg
costs. I generalize this formula in Armington setup with tariffs and highlight the importance of
revenue-generating tariffs.
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